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Abstract
The paper that introduced shape analysis sentences presented a method for
extracting a sentence in first-order logic that completely characterizes a run
of cpsa. Logical deduction can then be used to determine if a security goal
is satisfied.
This paper presents a method for importing shape analysis sentences into
a proof assistant on top of a detailed theory of strand spaces. The result is
a semantically rich environment in which the validity of a security goal can
be determined using shape analysis sentences and the foundation on which
they are based.
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1 Introduction
A central problem in cryptographic protocol analysis is to determine whether
a formula that expresses a security goal about behaviors compatible with a
protocol is true. Following [7], a security goal is a quantified implication:
∀~x.Φ0 ⊃
∨
1≤i≤n
∃~yi.Φi. (1)
The hypothesis Φ0 is a conjunction of atomic formulas describing regular
(honest) behavior. Each disjunct Φi that makes up the conclusion is also
a conjunction of atomic formulas. When Φi describes desired behaviors of
other regular participants, then the formula is an authentication goal. The
goal says that each run of the protocol compatible with Φ0 will include the
regular behavior described by one of the disjuncts. When n = 0, the goal’s
conclusion is false. In this case, if Φ0 mentions an unwanted disclosure, Eq. 1
says the disclosure cannot occur, thus a security goal with n = 0 expresses a
secrecy goal.
Guttman [7] presented a model-theoretic approach to establishing secu-
rity goals in the context of strand space theory. In that setting, a skeleton
describes regular behaviors compatible with a protocol. For skeleton k and
formula Φ, he defined k, α |= Φ to mean that the conjunction of atomic
formulas that make up Φ is satisfied in k with variable assignment α.
A realized skeleton is one that includes enough regular behavior to spec-
ify all the non-adversarial part of an execution of the protocol. In a realized
skeleton, its message transmissions combined with possible adversarial be-
havior explain every message reception in the skeleton.
In strand space theory, a homomorphism is a structure-preserving map δ
that shows how the behaviors in one skeleton are reflected within another.
As skeletons serve as models, homomorphisms preserve satisfaction for con-
junctions of atomic formulas.
The Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer (cpsa) constructs homo-
morphisms from a skeleton k0 to realized skeletons [14]. If cpsa termi-
nates, it generates a set of realized skeletons ki and a set of homomorphisms
δi :k0 7→ ki. These realized skeletons are all the minimal, essentially different
skeletons that are homomorphic images of k0 and are called the shapes of the
analysis.
Ramsdell [13] described cpsa’s support for security goals. cpsa includes
a tool that extracts a sentence that characterizes a shape analysis. This so
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called shape analysis sentence is special in that it encodes everything that
can be learned from the shape analysis.
Given a shape analysis sentence, a security goal is achieved if the goal
can be deduced from the sentence. cpsa includes a Prolog program that
translates shape analysis sentences into Prover9 [11] syntax. Typically, a
goal that is a theorem is quickly proved by Prover9.
There is another advantage to this approach. It can be tedious to generate
security goals. Realistic ones can be large and complicated. An easy way
to create one is to modify a shape analysis sentence. This typically involves
deleting parts of the conclusion.
There is a disadvantage to this approach. When a goal cannot be de-
duced from a shape analysis sentence, one cannot conclude that there is a
counterexample. It could be simply that the sentence is not relevant to the
security goal. It could also be that a proof of the goal depends on a fact not
exposed by a shape analysis sentence. For example, the precedes relation on
nodes in a skeleton is transitive, but that fact is not available to Prover9.
This paper describes the method that was used to import shape analysis
sentences into the proof assistant pvs [12] on top of a detailed theory of strand
spaces specified in pvs. In this environment, if the proof of a security goal
depends on the transitivity of the precedes relation, that fact is available
as a lemma. Furthermore, if a security goal is false, one can construct a
counterexample and use it to prove the security goal is in fact false.
In cpsa, executions of protocols are represented by skeletons. Associated
with each skeleton is a free message algebra generated by a finite set of
variables. Skeletons are used as models in the original paper on shape analysis
sentences.
The pvs strand space theory uses bundles over an initial algebra as its
representation of executions of protocols. This allows for a shallow embed-
ding of strand space theory in which algebra variables are replaced by logical
variables in pvs. This specification choice alleviates the need to manipulate
homomorphisms within pvs. Section 3 contains two descriptions that relate
skeletons to bundles.
Motivating Example. The running example used throughout this paper
is now presented. An informal version of the example is presented here, and
the example with all of the details filled in is in Section 4.
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The following simple example protocol is due to Bruno Blanchet [2].
A→ B : {|{|s|}a−1|}b
B → A : {|d|}s
Alice (A) freshly generates symmetric key s, signs the symmetric key with
her private uncompromised asymmetric key a−1 and intends to encrypt it
with Bob’s (B) uncompromised asymmetric key b. Alice expects to receive
data d encrypted, such that only Alice and Bob have access to it.
The protocol was constructed with a known flaw for expository purposes,
and as a result the secret is exposed due to an authentication failure. The
protocol does not prevent Alice from using a compromised key b′, so that
Mallory (M) and Eve (E) can perform this man-in-the-middle attack:
A→M : {|{|s|}a−1|}b′
M → B : {|{|s|}a−1|}b
B → E : {|d|}s
The protocol fails to provide a means for Bob to ensure the original
message was encrypted using his key. The authentication failure is avoided
with this variation of the protocol:
A→ B : {|{|s, b|}a−1 |}b
B → A : {|d|}s (2)
In strand space theory, a strand is a linearly ordered sequence of events
e0 ⇒ · · · ⇒ en−1, and an event is either a message transmission • → or a
reception • ←. In cpsa, adversarial behavior is not explicitly represented,
so strands always represent regular behavior.
Regular behavior is constrained by a set of roles that make up the proto-
col. In this protocol, Alice’s behaviors must be compatible with an initiator
role, and Bob’s behaviors follow a responder role.
init
•

// {|{|s|}a−1|}b
• {|d|}soo
resp
{|{|s|}a−1|}b // •
{|d|}s •oo
(3)
The important authentication goal from Bob’s perspective is that if an
instance of a responder role runs to completion, there must have been an
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instance of the initiator role that transmitted its first message. Furthermore,
assuming the symmetric key is freshly generated, and the private keys are
uncompromised, the two strands agree on keys used for signing and encryp-
tion.
A cpsa analysis of the authentication goal requires two inputs, a speci-
fication of the roles that make up the protocol, as in Eq. 3, and a question
about runs of the protocol. The question in this case is the hypothesis of
Eq. 4, that an instance of the responder role ran to completion. In these
diagrams, a strand instantiated from a role is distinguished from a role by
placing messages above communication arrows, and  is used to assert an
event occurred after another.
resp
•

{|{|s|}a−1 |}boo
• {|d|}s //
implies
resp init
•

{|{|s|}a−1 |}boo •{|{|s|}a−1 |}b′oo
• {|d|}s //
(4)
cpsa produces the conclusion in Eq. 4, that an instance of the initiator
role must have transmitted its first message, but it does not conclude that
the strands agree on the key used for the outer encryption. When cpsa is
run using the amended protocol in Eq. 2, the strands agree on the key, and
the authentication goal is achieved.
The contribution of this paper is a method of importing security goals
and the results of a cpsa analysis into pvs such that proofs about the goals
can rely on a detailed theory of strand spaces. The shape analysis sentence
associated with this example is presented in Section 4.
Some Related Work. This paper is the result of implementing security
goals as described by Guttman in [7]. The original motivation for extract-
ing shape analysis sentences rather than following the procedure in [7] was
ease of implementation. With shape analysis sentences, most of the work
is performed by a post-processing stage, and there were only a few changes
made to the core cpsa program. Only later was it realized the sense in which
shape analysis sentences completely characterize a shape analysis.
The Scyther tool [3] integrates security goal verification with its core
protocol analysis algorithm. Security goals are easy to state as long as they
can be expressed using a predefined vocabulary, however, there is no sense
in which Scyther goals characterize an analysis.
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The Protocol Composition Logic [4] provides a contrasting approach to
specifying security goals. It extends strand spaces by adding an operational
semantics as a small set of reduction rules, and a run of a protocol is a
sequence of reduction steps derived from an initial configuration. The logic
is a temporal logic interpreted over runs.
Structure of this Paper. Section 2 describes strand spaces as formalized
in pvs, Section 3 reintroduces shape analysis sentences, and Section 4 dis-
plays the example above in full detail. Appendix A describes an extension
that can be used to prove security goals that involve long-term state.
Notation. A finite sequence is a function from an initial segment of the
natural numbers. The length of a sequence X is |X|, and sequence X =
〈X(0), . . . , X(n − 1)〉 for n = |X|. If S is a set, then S∗ is the set of finite
sequences over S, and S+ is the non-empty finite sequences over S. The
prefix of sequence X of length n is X | n.
2 Strand Spaces
pvs is based on classical, typed higher-order logic. It has dependent types
and parameterized theories.
This section describes the pvs definition of strand spaces [15] in a style
motivated by the pvs language [12], that is, the presentation attempts to
minimize the gap between the actual proofs and this content.
Message Algebra. An order-sorted algebra [6] is a generalization of a
many-sorted algebra in which sorts may be partially ordered. The carrier
sets associated with ordered sorts are related by the subset relation.
Figure 1 shows the simplification of the cpsa message algebra signature
used by the examples in this paper. Sort > is the sort of all messages.
Messages of sort A (asymmetric keys), sort S (symmetric keys), and sort D
(data) are called atoms. Messages are atoms or constructed using encryption
{| · |}(·) and pairing (·, ·), where the comma operation is right associative and
parentheses are omitted when the context permits.
The message algebra A is the initial quotient term algebra over the signa-
ture. The canonical representative for each message is the term that contains
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Sorts: >, A, S, D
Subsorts: A < >, S < >, D < >
Operations: (·, ·) :>×> → > Pairing
{| · |}(·) :>× A→ > Asymmetric encryption
{| · |}(·) :>× S→ > Symmetric encryption
(·)−1 : A→ A Asymmetric key inverse
(·)−1 : S→ S Symmetric key inverse
ai, bi : A Asymmetric key constants
si : S Symmetric key constants
Equations: ai
−1 = bi bi
−1 = ai (i ∈ N)
∀k : A. (k−1)−1 = k ∀k : S. k−1 = k
Figure 1: Simple Crypto Algebra Signature
no occurrences of the inverse operation (·)−1. The set of messages associated
with a sort is called its carrier set. The set of message algebra atoms is B.
A message t0 is carried by t1, written t0 v t1 if t0 can be extracted from
a reception of t1, assuming plaintext is extractable from encryptions. In
other words, v is the smallest reflexive, transitive relation such that t0 v t0,
t0 v (t0, t1), t1 v (t0, t1), and t0 v {|t0|}t1 .
Strand Spaces. A run of a protocol is viewed as an exchange of messages
by a finite set of local sessions of the protocol. Each local session is called a
strand. The behavior of a strand, its trace, is a finite non-empty sequence of
messaging events. An event is either a message transmission or a reception.
Outbound message t ∈ A is written as +t, and inbound message t is written
as −t. The set of traces over A is C = (±A)+. A message originates in
trace C at index i if it is carried by C(i), C(i) is outbound, and it is not
carried by any event earlier in the trace.
A strand space Θ over algebra A is a finite non-empty sequence of traces
in C. A strand s is a member of the domain of Θ, and its trace is Θ(s).
An atom t is non-originating in a strand space Θ, written non(Θ, t), if it
originates on no strand.
Message events occur at nodes in a strand space. For each strand s, there
is a node for every event in Θ(s). The nodes of strand space Θ are {(s, i) |
s ∈ Dom(Θ), 0 ≤ i < |Θ(s)|}, and the event at a node is evtΘ(s, i) = Θ(s)(i).
A node names an event in a strand space. The relation⇒ defined by {(s, i−
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1) ⇒ (s, i) | s ∈ Dom(Θ), 1 ≤ i < |Θ(s)|} is called the strand succession
relation. An atom t uniquely originates in a strand space Θ at node n,
written uniq(Θ, t, n), if it originates in the trace of exactly one strand s at
index i, and n = (s, i).
Bundles. The pair Υ = (Θ,→) is a bundle if it defines a directed acyclic
graph, where the vertices are the nodes of Θ, and an edge represents commu-
nication (→) or strand succession (⇒) in Θ. For communication, if n0 → n1,
then there is a message t such that evtΘ(n0) = +t and evtΘ(n1) = −t. For
each reception node n1, there is a unique transmission node n0 with n0 → n1.
Each acyclic graph has a transitive irreflexive relation ≺ on its vertices.
The relation specifies the causal ordering of nodes in a bundle. A transitive
irreflexive binary relation is also called a strict order.
Runs of Protocols. In a run of a protocol, the behavior of each strand
is constrained by a role in a protocol. Adversarial strands are constrained
by roles as are non-adversarial strands. A role is a set of role items of the
form r(C,N,U), where C ∈ C, N ∈ P(B)+, U ∈ P(B)+, and the lengths
of C, N , and U agree. The trace of the role item is C, its non-origination
assumptions are N , and its unique origination assumptions are U . A strand
is an instance of a role item in a strand space, written inst(Θ, s, r(C,N,U)),
if for h = |Θ(s)|,
1. h ≤ |C|,
2. C | h = Θ(s),
3. for all i < h, t ∈ N(i) implies non(Θ, t), and
4. for all i < h, t ∈ U(i) implies uniq(Θ, t, (s, i)).
A protocol is a set of roles. A bundle Υ = (Θ,→) is a run of protocol P if
there is a role assignment rl : Dom(Θ)→ P such that for each s ∈ Dom(Θ),
there exists r(C,N,U) ∈ rl(s) such that inst(Θ, s, r(C,N,U)). Let RP be
the set of bundles that are runs of protocol P .
The description of roles differs from most presentations. Role origination
assumptions usually are specified by a set of atoms, instead of a sequence
of sets of atoms. The pvs theory follows the technique used in the cpsa
implementation. A sequence is used so as to make explicit the length of the
8
create(t ∈ B) = 〈+t〉
pair(t0 :>, t1 :>) = 〈−t0,−t1,+(t0, t1)〉
sep(t0 :>, t1 :>) = 〈−(t0, t1),+t0,+t1〉
enc(t :>, k : A|S) = 〈−t,−k,+{|t|}k〉
dec(t :>, k : A|S) = 〈−{|t|}k,−k−1,+t〉
Figure 2: Adversary Traces
instance of a role at which each origination assumption applies. Furthermore,
roles are normally described as templates to be copied and refined, rather
than as sets of role items. This difference will be addressed in the next
section.
Adversary Model. The traces of the roles that constrain adversarial be-
havior are in Figure 2. For the encryption related traces, k :A|S asserts that
k : A or k : S. There are no origination assumptions in the adversary’s roles.
The parameter of the create role is restricted to atoms. In fact, the defin-
ing characteristic of an atom is it denotes the set of messages the adversary
can create out of thin air modulo origination assumptions.
3 Importing Protocol Analyses
Unlike the pvs theories, cpsa does not use bundles as its representation of
runs of a protocol. Instead, it uses abstract interpretation to discuss sets of
bundles using an object called a skeleton.
Skeletons. Skeletons and bundles share the same signature, but their al-
gebras differ. Rather than using the initial algebra, each skeleton has a free
algebra generated from a finite set of variables. Subscripting is used to in-
dicate when a free algebra is in use. Thus, if X is a set of variables along
with their sorts, then ΘX is a strand space over the free algebra generated
by X, AX .
The treatment of roles is slightly different in cpsa. The pvs theories
define a role as a set of role items as described earlier. In cpsa, a role is a
template that is instantiated to produce the equivalent of a role item via an
algebra homomorphism σ. Thus for cpsa role r = r(CX , NX , UX), the related
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role item-like object is r(σ ◦CX , σ ◦NX , σ ◦UX), which by abuse of notation,
we write as σ(r). A pvs role is template inspired by r = r(CX , NX , UX) if it
is of the form {σ(r) | σ ∈ AX → A}.
Associated with each skeleton is protocol P as a set of roles in template
form, and a strand space ΘX . In cpsa syntax, the trace and role associated
with a strand is specified by an instance. An instance is of the form i(r, h, σ),
where r ∈ P is a role, h specifies the length of a trace instantiated from the
role, and σ specifies how to instantiate the variables in the role to obtain
the trace. Thus the trace in CX associated with i(r(CY , UY , NY ), h, σ) is
σ ◦CY | h, the prefix of length h that results from applying σ to CY , where σ
is a homomorphism from AY to AX .
A skeleton has the form k(P, IX ,≺, NX , UX), where P is the protocol,
IX is an instance map, ≺ is a strict node ordering, NX is a set of atoms
assumed to be non-originating, and UX is a set of atoms assumed to be
uniquely originating. The instance map IX is a finite non-empty sequence
of instances, where the range of the homomorphism associated with each
instance is AX .
The strand space associated with a skeleton is defined by its instance
map. When IX(s) = i(r(CY , UY , NY ), h, σ), trace ΘX(s) = σ ◦ CY | h. We
write k(P, IX ,≺, NX , UX) as kX(P, I,≺, N, U) in what follows.
Homomorphisms. Let k0 = kX(P, I0,≺0, N0, U0) and k1 = kY (P, I1,≺1,
N1, U1) be skeletons, and let Θ0 and Θ1 be the strand spaces associated
with I0 and I1. There is a skeleton homomorphism (φ, σ) :k0 7→ k1 if φ and σ
are maps with the following properties:
1. φ maps strands of k0 into those of k1, and nodes as φ((s, i)) = (φ(s), i),
that is φ is in Dom(Θ0)→ Dom(Θ1);
2. σ ∈ AX → AY is a message algebra homomorphism;
3. n ∈ nodes(Θ0) implies σ(evtΘ0(n)) = evtΘ1(φ(n));
4. n0 ≺0 n1 implies φ(n0) ≺1 φ(n1);
5. σ(N0) ⊆ N1;
6. t ∈ U0 implies σ(t) ∈ U1 and φ(Ok0(t)) = Ok1(σ(t));
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whereOk(t) is the node of the event at which t originates. Property 6 says the
node at which an atom uniquely originates is preserved by homomorphisms.
The definition of a skeleton homomorphism can be extended so that a
bundle can be in the range. In this case, the range of the message alge-
bra homomorphism is the initial algebra A. Property 5 and 6 require small
tweaks: for non-origination, t ∈ N0 implies non(Θ1, σ(t)), and for unique
origination, t ∈ U0 implies uniq(Θ1, σ(t), φ(Ok0(t))). Notice that a homo-
morphism between skeletons preserves the protocol. For the case of a bundle
in the range, we require that it be a run of the protocol of the skeleton.
Let pt(k) be P , the protocol of k, so that the final condition can be written
as Υ ∈ Rpt(k). The bundles associated with skeleton k are {Υ | ∃δ. δ :k 7→ Υ}.
When given a point-of-view skeleton k0, if cpsa terminates, it produces
a shape analysis of the form δi : k0 7→ ki. The skeletons ki are the shapes of
this protocol analysis, and they specify all of the non-adversarial behavior
associated with a run compatible with the point-of-view skeleton. The shape
analysis is complete if for all Υ and δ, δ :k0 7→ Υ iff ∃i, δ′. δ′ :ki 7→ Υ. See [10]
for a proof of cpsa’s completeness.
Shape Analysis Sentences. The results of a shape analysis are imported
into pvs by translating the analysis into a sentence that is asserted as an
axiom in pvs, justified by the fact that the shape analysis is complete. The
translation is similar to the one appearing in [13], however this one is superior
due to the foundation provided by the bundle-based strand space theory
presented earlier. Much of the translation is simply valid by definition. Pay
particular attention to the translation of instances.
We define KΥ(k) = (Y,Φ), where Φ is k’s skeleton formula, and Y is
the formula’s set of variables along with their sorts. Let k = kX(P, I,≺,
N, U). The set Y is X augmented with a fresh variable zs for each strand
s ∈ Dom(I). In formulas, zs ranges over Dom(Θ), where Θ is the strand
space of Υ. The formula Φ is a conjunction of atomic formulas composed as
follows.
• For each s ∈ Dom(I), assert htin(Θ, zs, h, σ(r)), where I(s) = i(r, h, σ),
and htin(Θ, zs, h, r) = h ≤ |Θ(s)| ∧ inst(Θ, zs, r).
• For each (s, i) ≺ (s′, i′), assert (zs, i) ≺Υ (zs′ , i′).
• For each t ∈ N , assert non(Θ, t).
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• For each t ∈ U , assert uniq(Θ, t, (zs, i)), where (s, i) = Ok(t).
When KΥ(k) = (X,Φ), the predicate Σk = λΥ.Υ ∈ Rpt(k) ∧ ∃X.Φ is
closed. (In what follows,X will refer to the set of algebra variables augmented
with strand variables.) The bundle Υ is a pair (Θ,→), so the strand space Θ
is the first element of the pair, and ≺Υ is derived from the communication
edges → and the strand succession edges in Θ.
The formula describing a skeleton is order-sorted. A truth assignment
that tells one how to interpret each skeleton formula must account for this
fact. As such, the domain of discourse for interpretation I(Υ) contains the
carrier set for each sort in the initial message algebra. Additionally, for Υ =
(Θ,→), the domain of discourse includes the set Dom(Θ), used to interpret
strand variables zs. The interpretation of predicates and function symbols
follows the case of a many-sorted algebra [5, Section 4.3]. See [6, Section 4]
for a description of the reduction of an order-sorted algebra to a many-sorted
algebra.
Theorem 1. Let KΥ(k) = (X,Φ) and Σk = λΥ.Υ ∈ Rpt(k) ∧∃X.Φ. For all
bundles Υ, Σk(Υ) iff there is a homomorphism from k to Υ, i.e.
Σk(Υ)⇐⇒ ∃δ. δ : k 7→ Υ.
Thus {Υ | Σk(Υ)} is another way to specify the bundles associated with
skeleton k.
The intuition behind this proof is the observation that there is an intimate
relationship between the homomorphism and the variable assignment used
to interpret existentially quantified variables.
Proof. Consider the backward implication first. We are given k = k(P, I,≺,
N, U), δ = (φ, σ), and Υ = (Θ,→) such that δ : k 7→ Υ. To interpret
formula Φ, construct the variable assignment α as follows. For each strand
variable zs, α(zs) = φ(s). Each algebra variable x has a corresponding logical
variable, so α(x) = σ(x).
The interpretation I(Υ) satisfies Φ with α if each conjunct does so. For
some s ∈ Dom(I), consider the atomic formula htin(Θ, zs, h, σ′(r)), where
I(s) = i(r, h, σ′). Its interpretation is htin(Θ, α(zs), h, α(σ′(r))) which is
htin(Θ, φ(s), h, σ(σ′(r))). By definition, htin(Θ, φ(s), h, σ(σ′(r))) = h ≤
|Θ(φ(s))| ∧ inst(Θ, φ(s), σ(σ′(r))). By Property 1 in the definition of a
homomorphism, the length of strand φ(s) must be greater than or equal
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to h. Let r = r(CY , UY , NY ). Recall that inst(Θ, φ(s), σ(σ
′(r))) implies that
σ ◦ σ′ ◦Cy | h′ = Θ(φ(s)), where h′ = |Θ(φ(s))|, which is true by Property 3.
For the ≺Υ predicate, Property 4 in the definition of homomorphism
applies, for non, it’s the tweak of Property 5, and for uniq , it’s the tweak of
Property 6.
Now consider the forward implication in the theorem. In this case, we are
given the variable assignment α such that I(Υ) satisfies Φ with α and must
construct the corresponding homomorphism. For each strand variable zs,
φ(s) = α(zs). Each algebra variable x has a corresponding logical variable,
so σ(x) = α(x).
With this definition of δ, we show that δ : k 7→ Υ. Substitution σ is a
message algebra homomorphism, thus demonstrating Property 2.
For all s ∈ Dom(I), assume I(Υ) satisfies htin(Θ, zs, h, σ′(r)) with α,
where I(s) = i(r, h, σ′). Therefore, htin(Θ, α(zs), h, α(σ′(r))) is true,
and so is htin(Θ, φ(s), h, σ(σ′(r))) and by definition h ≤ |Θ(φ(s))| and
inst(Θ, φ(s), σ(σ′(r))). The height restriction h ≤ |Θ(φ(s))| ensures φ maps
correctly as prescribed in Property 1. Consider node n = (s, i) in k. The
event in k at n is σ′(CY (i)) where r = r(CY , UY , NY ). The inst assertion im-
plies that event evtΘ(φ(n)) is σ(σ
′(CY (i))), thus demonstrating Property 3.
Property 4, 5, and 6 are straightforward.
In what follows, a sentence that universally quantifies a bundle, as in
∀Υ.Φ, is true if for all Υ, I(Υ) models Φ. Define |=I(Υ) Φ to mean I(Υ)
models Φ, and |=I(Υ) Φ with α to mean I(Υ) satisfies Φ with variable as-
signment α.
Given a set of homomorphisms δi : k0 7→ ki, its shape analysis sentence
S(δi : k0 7→ ki) is
∀Υ ∈ Rpt(k0), X0.Φ0 ⇐⇒
∨
i
∃Xi.∆i ∧ Φi, (5)
where KΥ(k0) = (X0,Φ0). The same procedure produces Xi and Φi for
shape ki with one proviso—the variables in Xi that also occur in X0 must be
renamed to avoid trouble while encoding the structure preserving maps δi.
The structure preserving maps δi = (φi, σi) are encoded in ∆i by a con-
junction of equalities. Map σi is coded as equalities between a message alge-
bra variable in the domain of σi and the term it maps to. Map φi is coded as
equalities between strand variables in Φ0 and strand variables in Φi. Let Z0
be the sequence of strand variables freshly generated for k0, and Zi be the
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k0
δi //
δ′0 
ki
δ′i

Υ
Figure 3: Homomorphism Diagram
ones generated for ki. The strand mapping part of ∆i is
∧
j∈Dom(Θ0) Z0(j) =
Zi(φi(j)), where Θ0 is the strand space associated with k0.
An example shape analysis sentence is displayed in Figure 5.
Theorem 2. If δi : k0 7→ ki is a complete shape analysis then S(δi : k0 7→ ki)
is true.
Proof. We show for all bundles Υ ∈ Rpt(k0), |=I(Υ) ∀X0.Φ0 ⇐⇒
∨
i ∃Xi.∆i∧
Φi, which reduces to showing |=I(Υ) Φ0 ⇐⇒
∨
i ∃Xi.∆i ∧ Φi with α for all
variable assignments α for X0. Take cases on the truth of |=I(Υ) Φ0 with α.
When true, by the proof of Theorem 1, α specifies the homomorphism
δ′0 : k0 7→ Υ. Because the shape analysis is complete, for some i, δ′i : ki 7→ Υ.
By Theorem 1, |=I(Υ) ∃Xi.Φi and therefore |=I(Υ) Φi with αi, where αi is the
variable assignment derived from δ′i. Let α⊕αi be the union of the mappings
in α and αi (the domains of α and αi are disjoint). The proof of this case is
complete when we show |=I(Υ) ∆i with α ⊕ αi. Recall that δi : k0 7→ ki and
let δi = (φi, σi). See Figure 3 and note that δ
′
0 = δ
′
i ◦ δi. For each variable x
in the domain of σi, ∆i contains the equation x = σi(x). Its interpretation
is α(x) = αi(σi(x)). In other words, σ
′
0(x) = σ
′
i(σi(x)), because σ
′
0 = σ
′
i ◦ σi.
For each strand j in k0, ∆i contains the equation Z0(j) = Zi(φi(j)). Its
interpretation is α(Z0(j)) = αi(Zi(φi(j))). In other words, φ
′
0(j) = φ
′
i(φi(j)),
because φ′0 = φ
′
i ◦ φi.
When 6|=I(Υ) Φ0 with α, there is no homomorphism of the form δ′0:k0 7→ Υ.
Suppose for some i, δ′i : ki 7→ Υ. Then δ′0 = δ′i ◦ δi is a contradiction, so, for
all i, δ′i : ki 67→ Υ. By Theorem 1, 6|=I(Υ) ∃Xi.Φi and therefore 6|=I(Υ) ∃Xi.Φi
with α implying there is no disjunct on the R.H.S. that is true.
Listeners. The relationship between skeletons and bundles is not as tidy
as previously described. cpsa supports something called listener strands
that do not appear in bundles. A listener strand in a skeleton is an artificial
strand used to assert that some message is available to the adversary. A
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listener strand has length two, and the second event is the transmission of
the message received by the first event.
When translating a listener strand into a bundle, one simply asserts the
existence of a node in the bundle that transmits the strand’s message, and
that node inherits the node orderings associated with the nodes of the listener
strand.
The definition of a homomorphism into a bundle requires adjustment to
allow for the disappearance of listener strands. In particular, the definition of
a homomorphism must use the roles in instances to identify listener strands.
4 Detailed Example
The simple example protocol is now revisited.
A→ B : {|{|s|}a−1|}b
B → A : {|d|}s
Symmetric key s is freshly generated, asymmetric keys a−1 and b−1 are un-
compromised, and the goal of the protocol is to keep data d secret. The pvs
description of the protocol in Eq. 3, has an initiator and a responder role.
The role items are:
init(a, b : A, s : S, d : D) = r(〈+{|{|s|}a−1 |}b,−{|d|}s〉, 〈∅, ∅〉, 〈{s}, ∅〉)
resp(a, b : A, s : S, d : D) = r(〈−{|{|s|}a−1|}b,+{|d|}s〉, 〈∅, ∅〉, 〈∅, ∅〉) (6)
The init role is {r | ∃a, b : A, s : S, d : D. r = init(a, b, s, d)} and the resp
role is analogous. This rendition of each role ensures it is template inspired.
In this protocol, the unique origination assumption is specified in the init
role, while the two non-origination assumptions are specified in skeletons.
The protocol was constructed with a known flaw for expository purposes,
and as a result the secret is exposed due to an authentication failure. The
desired authentication goal is:
∀(Θ,→) ∈ Rpt(k0), a, b : A, s : S, d : D, z ∈ Dom(Θ).
htin(Θ, z, 2, resp(a, b, s, d)) ∧ non(Θ, a−1) ∧ non(Θ, b−1)
⊃ ∃a0 : A, s0 : S, d0 : D, z0 ∈ Dom(Θ). htin(Θ, z0, 1, init(a0, b, s0, d0))
that is, when the responder (B) runs to completion, there is an initiator (A)
that is using b for the encryption of its initial message.
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k0 = kX({init(a0, b0, s0, d0), resp(a1, b1, s1, d1)}, Protocol
〈i(resp, 2, {a1 7→ a, b1 7→ b, s1 7→ s, d1 7→ d})〉, Instances
∅, Node orderings
{a−1, b−1}, Non-origination
∅) Unique origination
where X = a, b : A, s : S, d : D
k1 = kY ({init(a0, b0, s0, d0), resp(a1, b1, s1, d1)}, Protocol
〈i(resp, 2, {a1 7→ a, b1 7→ b, s1 7→ s, d1 7→ d}),
i(init , 1, {a0 7→ a, b0 7→ b′, s0 7→ s, d0 7→ d′})〉
Instances
Note b0 is b
′ not b!
{(1, 0) ≺ (0, 0)}, Node orderings
{a−1, b−1}, Non-origination
{s}) Unique origination
where Y = a, b, b′ : A, s : S, d, d′ : D
δ1 = (〈0〉, {a 7→ a, b 7→ b, s 7→ s, d 7→ d})
Figure 4: Shape Analysis for the Simple Example Protocol
∀(Θ,→) ∈ Rpt(k0), a0, b0 : A, s0 : S, d0 : D, z0 ∈ Dom(Θ).
htin(Θ, z0, 2, resp(a0, b0, s0, d0)) ∧ non(Θ, a0−1) ∧ non(Θ, b0−1)
⇐⇒
∃a1, b1, b2 : A, s1 : S, d1, d2 : D, z1, z2 ∈ Dom(Θ).
z0 = z1 ∧ a0 = a1 ∧ b0 = b1 ∧ s0 = s1 ∧ d0 = d1 ∧
htin(Θ, z1, 2, resp(a1, b1, s1, d1)) ∧
htin(Θ, z2, 1, init(a1, b2, s1, d2)) ∧
(z2, 0) ≺(Θ,→) (z1, 0) ∧ uniq(Θ, s1, (z2, 0)) ∧
non(Θ, a1
−1) ∧ non(Θ, b1−1)
Figure 5: Shape Analysis Sentence for the Simple Example Protocol
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To investigate this goal, we ask cpsa to find out what other regular
behaviors must occur when a responder runs to completion by giving cpsa
skeleton k0 in Figure 4. cpsa produces shape k1 that shows that an initiator
must run, but it need not use the same key to encrypt its first message. The
shape analysis sentence for this scenario is displayed in Figure 5. Needless
to say, the authentication goal cannot be deduced from this sentence due
to the man-in-the-middle attack discussed earlier. However, one can prove
the security goal is false by constructing a bundle that contains the man-in-
the-middle attack specified with the help of adversarial stands, and using it
as a counterexample to the security goal. If one repeats the analysis using
the protocol in Eq. 2, the generated shape analysis sentence can be used to
deduce the authentication goal.
5 Discussion
Theorems 1 and 2 correspond to theorems with the same numbers in [13].
There are several key differences between the two works. Higher-order logic is
used for shape analysis sentences here, but [13] follows the first-order logic,
model theoretic approach set out in [7]. A first-order formulation of this
version of shape analysis sentences is straightforward, but would obscure
their use in pvs.
The second difference is this work uses bundles over initial algebras for
models, whereas the previous works use skeletons over free algebras. The
shallow embedding of strand space theory in pvs motivates this choice.
Finally, this work faithfully captures the semantics of the roles of the
protocol being analyzed via the height-instance predicate htin, which is de-
fined using roles as sets of role items. In previous works, a role origination
assumption was ignored.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a method for importing security goals and the results
of a cpsa analysis into pvs such that proofs about the goals can rely on a
detailed theory of strand spaces. The method uses a shallow embedding of the
theory within pvs. To enable the embedding, the concept of roles as sets of
role items was introduced. As a result, there is no need to explicitly represent
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substitutions, homomorphisms, and skeletons within pvs to prove security
goals. Instead, shape analysis sentences perform the task of transporting
results from cpsa into pvs.
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A Role Annotations
There is a simple extension to the strand space theory in Section 2 that allows
the ability to annotate an event in a role with an object of any type T. In
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practice, few events in a role need annotation, so for type T, events are
associated with the type lift(T). A lifted type has two constructors and one
accessor, so x ∈ lift(T) implies that x = ⊥ or x = ↑y for some y :T. If x = ↑y
then y = ↓x.
Annotations were added by modifying the definition of a role item to be
of the form r(C,N,U,A), where C, N , and U are as before, A ∈ lift(T)+,
and the length of A is the same as the length of C. Let role assignment rl
demonstrate that bundle Υ is a run of some protocol. Node n = (s, i)
in Υ = (Θ,→) is annotated with a ∈ T, written anno(Υ, rl , n, a) if
∃r(C,N,U,A) ∈ rl(s).
inst(Θ, s, r(C,N,U,A)) ∧ A(i) = ↑a
The set of annotated nodes is
anode((Θ,→), rl) = {n ∈ nodes(Θ) | ∃a : T. anno((Θ,→), rl , n, a)}
The annotations can be used to enrich the specification of security goals.
For example, annotations can be used to combine trust management theories
with cryptographic protocols [9]. In this use case, events are annotated with
formulas from a trust management logic. A formula on an outbound event is
a guarantee and the sender must show the formula is true before sending the
message. A formula on an inbound event is an assumption that can be used
by the receiver to deduce future guarantees. The bundle-based strand space
theory can be used to ensure that whenever a receiver relies on a formula,
another principle has previously guaranteed it.
Role annotations can also be used to reason about state-based protocols.
The state in the protocol is modeled as a set of states and a transition
relation τ . An infinite sequence of states pi is a path if ∀i ∈ N. (pi(i), pi(i+1)) ∈
τ . To use role annotations to reason about state, events in roles are annotated
with subsets of the transition relation, that is T = P(τ). The art to making
effective use of a state agnostic protocol analyzer is to modify the message-
passing part of the protocol so that a representation of state is threaded
through an execution via receive-send pairs of strand succession nodes, where
the transmitting node is annotated with a set of transitions consistent with
the threaded state.
A bundle Υ is compatible [8, Def. 11] with a state-based role assignment rl
if there exists ` ∈ N, f ∈ anode(Υ, rl)→ {0, 1, . . . , `− 1}, and pi ∈ path such
that
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1. f is bijective,
2. ∀n0, n1 ∈ anode(Υ, rl). n0 ≺ n1 ⇐⇒ f(n0) < f(n1), and
3. ∀n ∈ anode(Υ, rl), a ∈ P(τ).
anno(Υ, rl , n, a) ⊃ (pi(f(n)), pi(f(n) + 1)) ∈ a.
This definition ties together the state and message-passing worlds and allows
for the verification of state sensitive security goals. An in-depth paper de-
scribing this technique by Dan Dougherty, Joshua Guttman, Paul Rowe, and
this author is forthcoming.
This appendix ends with a simple example of a stateful protocol called
the Award Card Protocol (acp) created by Joshua Guttman and the author.
The state in this protocol is a card with some boxes. When the card is issued,
no box is checked. Each time a buyer purchases an item, the cashier checks
one box. The buyer may redeem the card when all boxes are checked. It is
assumed that a buyer possesses no more than one card at any time.
For simplicity, suppose every card has just one box and there are two
interactions with cashiers. Annotated nodes can be used to prove the two
interactions are totally ordered and there must have been a new card issued
between the cashier interactions. A sketch of the proof follows. The model
of state is described first, next the protocol roles, then the method by which
the lemma in the state model is imported into the strand space world, and
finally, the use of a shape analysis sentence to finish the proof of the security
goal.
The model of state is not restricted to a card with one box. Let bx be
the number of boxes on a card. Each state s ∈ υ is the number of unchecked
boxes. The transition relation is τ = {(s0, s1) | s0 = s1 +1∨s1 = bx}, that is
one box can be checked, or a new card can be issued when one is redeemed
or lost. The following lemma can be proved by induction.
Lemma 1 (Check or Issue).
∀pi ∈ path, i, k ∈ N.
i ≤ k ⊃
pi(i) ≥ pi(k) ∨
∃j ∈ N. i < j ∧ j ≤ k ∧ pi(j) = bx
In words, either a card has less checked boxes than a predecessor or there
must have been a new card transition in between.
21
buyer
•

// {|buy , nc, c|}b
•

{|nc, nb, b|}coo
• // (nc, nb)
cashier
{|buy , nc, c|}b // •
{|nc, nb, b|}c •

oo
{|one, b, c|}k // •
{|zero, b, c|}k •

oo
(nc, nb) // •
new card
new // •
{|one, b, c|}k •oo
b, c : A, k : S, nb, nc :D
Figure 6: Award Card Protocol Traces
The Award Card Protocol requires an addition to the signature in Fig-
ure 1—an infinite set of constants gi of sort > called tags. This protocol uses
four tags, zero = g0, one = g1, buy = g2, and new = g3.
There are three roles in the acp, a new card issuer, a cashier, and a buyer.
The trace of each role is displayed in Figure 6.
An interaction between a cashier and a buyer is authenticated using a
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe inspired message pattern. Ignore the third and
fourth event in the cashier role to see the pattern.
The remainder of the events in the roles encode the state, most using the
encoding produced by the injective function g(s) = gs. The third and fourth
event in the cashier role encode a box checking transition. The first and
second event in the new card role encode a new card transition, where the
first event is a dummy value due to the special form of a new card transition.
In general, state encoding message events are inbound followed by out-
bound event pairs. The outbound event of the pair is annotated. If i
is the index of the outbound event of trace C, then it is annotated with
{(s0, s1) | g(s0) = h(C(i − 1)) ∧ g(s1) = h(C(i))}, where h extracts the
portion of the message from an event that encodes the state. In the special
case of events of the form of a new card transition, the outbound event is
annotated with {(s0, s1) | g(s1) = h(C(i))}.
When analyzing the acp, cpsa has no means by which to enforce the
linear ordering of state encoding nodes in bundles, and it may produce a
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Lemma 2 (Bridge).
∀Υ, rl . compatible(Υ, rl) ⊃
∀n0, n1 ∈ anode(Υ, rl), a0, a1 ∈ P(τ), s0, s1 ∈ υ.
anno(Υ, rl , n0, a0) ∧ anno(Υ, rl , n1, a1) ∧ n0 ≺ n1 ∧
a0 ⊆ {(s2, s3) | s3 = s0} ∧ a1 ⊆ {(s2, s3) | s2 = s1} ⊃
s0 ≥ s1 ∨
∃n ∈ anode(Υ, rl).
anno(Υ, rl , n, {(s2, s3) | s3 = bx}) ∧
n0 ≺ n ∧ n ≺ n1
shape analysis sentence that is incompatible with our notion of state. To
verify state aware security goals, we will restrict our attention to the bundles
that are compatible with the role assignment implied by the role definitions.
Because function f in the definition of compatibility is a bijection, annotated
nodes in compatible bundles must be linearly ordered.
The compatible bundle assumption allows one to infer the existence of
nodes that are not revealed by cpsa. In the case of the acp, this is done by
importing the Check or Issue Lemma into the strand space world by proving
the Bridge Lemma (Lemma 2). The proof of the Bridge Lemma makes use
of every part of the definition of compatibility.
The implication in the Check or Issue Lemma corresponds to the second
implication in the Bridge Lemma. The correspondence of the conclusions
of each implication is straightforward, however, the hypothesis of the Bridge
Lemma is much more complicated than the one in the Check or Issue Lemma.
Yet all it is saying is that the beginning and ending states over the range of
the path are s0 and s1, where as in the Check or Issue Lemma, those states
are simply referred to by pi(i) and pi(k).
Dear reader, at this point I promised to describe the use of a shape
analysis sentence to complete the proof of the security goal. I fibbed. This
example is so simple and contrived, there is no need to run cpsa at all! The
fact that when there are two interactions with cashiers, there must have been
a new card issued between the cashier interactions follows from the point-
of-view skeleton one would use to analyze this security goal. In this respect,
this is a very unusual example.
The above procedure for verifying security goals of protocols with state
has been successfully applied to the Envelope Protocol [1]. In this case, two
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shape analysis sentences are required to prove the most interesting security
goal. The pvs proof is detailed and involved, and relies on fundamental
properties of bundles.
For example, it was shown in pvs that if node n0 is before some trans-
mission node n2, then either the nodes are on the same strand or there is a
reception node n1 before n2 on the same strand, such that n0 is before n1.
The compatibility assumption implies a total ordering among transmission
nodes with annotations. The above lemma is used to infer the correct order-
ing of nodes that receive state encoding messages. The lemma is also used
in the proof of the acp security goal.
The proof of the Envelope Protocol security goal will be described in the
forthcoming paper mentioned earlier.
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